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ABSTRACT
European integration is increasingly contested in public. What are the policy
consequences of this EU politicization? This article argues that politicization
challenges the hitherto often technocratic mode of policy preparation in the
European Commission. Increased public attention and contestation render the
diffuse public a more relevant stakeholder for Europe’s central agenda-setter
because future competence transfers to Brussels are more likely to be
scrutinized in the public realm. This incentivizes Commission actors to
generate widely dispersed regulatory benefits through its policy initiatives,
particularly where an initiative covers publicly salient issues. Applying this
expectation to 17 European consumer policy initiatives suggests that the
Commission orients its policy proposals towards wide-spread consumer
interest during periods of high EU politicization and issue salience. However,
the mechanism is constrained by internal turf conflicts and anticipated
Council preferences. These findings highlight that politicization entails both
chances and risks for further, policy-driven integration in Europe.
KEYWORDS Consumer policy; European Commission; European integration; politicization;
responsiveness; salience
Introduction
Analyses of European integration increasingly revolve around the idea that
supranational ‘decision making has shifted from an insulated elite to mass
politics’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 13). The surge of Eurosceptic parties in
the latest European Parliament (EP) elections or the Brexit referendum
provide particularly glaring examples for this claim. Contrasting the ‘permiss-
ive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970), we observe an ‘increase in the
polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are
publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the Euro-
pean Union’ (De Wilde 2011: 560).
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This politicization is assumed to affect supranational decision-making pro-
foundly (Zürn 2014). Some observers argue that public debates enhance the
European Union’s (EU) democratic responsiveness (Follesdal and Hix 2006;
Magnette 2001; Rauh and Zürn 2014). Others praise technocratic insulation
and fear that politicization decreases efficiency and executive leeway in
pushing European integration forward (Bartolini 2006; Hooghe and Marks
2009; Majone 2002; Moravcsik 1998).
There is, however, only scant empirical knowledge on the actual policy con-
sequences of EU politicization. Recent research debates whether politicization
constrained responses to the Euro and Schengen crises (Börzel and Risse 2017;
Schimmelfennig 2014). Other recent evidence suggests that supranational
elites communicate public interests more strongly in the face of politicization
(De Bruycker 2017). But does politicization also affect the mid-range policy
choices along the ‘community method’ that have shaped the course of Euro-
pean integration thus far?
The European Commission is particularly relevant for this question. It
embodies the tensions of insulated, technocratic policy-making on the one
hand, and publically accountable governance on the other (Christiansen
1997; Wille 2013). Its monopoly of initiative in the regulation of European
markets grants significant agenda-setting power over the contents of EU
law – a power the Commission has often used in an entrepreneurial
manner, adapting treaty interpretations to changing context conditions
(Cram 1997).
This article argues that EU politicization incentivizes Europe’s central
agenda-setter to be more responsive to public interests. A Commission inter-
ested in the retention of its competences should aim at widely dispersed
regulatory benefits when the EU is heavily debated in public. But this strategy
risks alienating traditional stakeholders, most notably member state govern-
ments and cross-nationally operating businesses. Hence, the Commission
will tilt its proposals towards diffuse public interests mainly in cases where
the public is likely to note the respective policy choices. This is true if
general EU politicization combines with a high public salience of the specific
regulatory issues at stake.
The article provides a plausibility probe of this argument in European con-
sumer policy. Harmonizing European markets in this area, the Commission
faces a choice between serving narrowly concentrated producer interests
or widely dispersed consumer interests. A summary of 17 case studies on
consumer policies between 1999 and 2008 is consistent with the expectation
that the Commission’s positioning on this continuum is sensitive to general-
ized EU politicization and specific issue salience. However, such enhanced
responsiveness is constrained by the aggregated preferences of the EU
member states and the heightened conflict potential within the Commission
itself.
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Supranational policy-making in the public spotlight
The politicization of European integration
Supranational integration has always involved political – that is, collectively
binding – decisions, but the politicization concept stresses the degree to
which these decisions are also collectively debated. Zürn et al. (2012: 71)
understand politicization as ‘growing public awareness of international insti-
tutions and increased public mobilisation of competing political preferences
regarding institutions’ policies or procedures’. Politicization is thus more
than just a synonym for declining support for supranational governance. It
contains both the resistance against specific international institutions and
the formulation of demands for more or other international policies. The
concept furthermore reaches beyond institutional disagreement and captures
in how far decisions are pulled into the public spotlight. In the context of Euro-
pean integration, Statham and Trenz (2012: 3) understand politicization as
debates and controversies on supranational issues in the public sphere.
Hutter et al. (2016) also emphasize that politicization finds it expression in
decidedly public, mainly mass-mediated debates. In his encompassing con-
ceptualization, De Wilde (2011) defines EU politicization as an increased
public involvement of societal actors such as political parties, mass media,
social movements in the process of European integration, and the degree
to which this resonates among the wider European citizenry.
Despite disagreement on the root causes of this EU politicization, there is a
clear convergence on its empirical components (De Wilde et al. 2016; Rauh
2016: Chapter 2). The first one is salience, meaning the degree to which Euro-
pean integration is visible and important to the broader citizenry. The second
component is polarization, meaning the degree to which public opinions on
European integration diverge. The third component is mobilization,
meaning the extent to which public debates expand to include actors
beyond supra- and international executives.
This threefold conceptualization, allows us to assess the long-term, aggre-
gate politicization potential of European integration. To hold context con-
ditions largely constant, while allowing a sufficient time frame and keeping
research efforts feasible, I concentrate on the EU-6 countries here. Public sal-
ience of the EU is proxied by the monthly share of articles referring to the EU in
the headline in one opinion-leading newspaper per country. To study the
polarization of public opinion, the seminal Eurobarometer item on support
for a country’s EU membership taps into the cumulative assessments of Euro-
pean integration in the wider public (Lubbers and Scheepers 2005). I focus on
the bi-annual EU-6 averages of the item’s variance and kurtosis as indicators of
opinion polarization (Down and Wilson 2008). Mobilization on European inte-
gration, finally, is captured by the monthly counts of publically staged protest
events addressing the EU or its policies (Uba and Uggla 2011).1
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Standardizing and combining these indicators into an additive index pro-
vides reliable comparisons of EU politicization over time. As indicated by
the OLS time trend in Figure 1, the politicization potential of European inte-
gration in the wider public has consistently increased since the early 1990s
– mainly driven by an almost continuously differentiating public opinion on
EU membership. But EU politicization is also subject to significant short-
term swings driven by local peaks in media salience and protests around
major integration events such as EP elections, enlargement rounds, and
especially treaty revisions.
From the perspective of Brussels’ hallways, these data suggest that public
attention and contestation have become an increasingly important context
condition of supranational policy-making while corresponding pressures
also fluctuate in the short run. So how, if at all, can we expect the European
Commission to respond to the thus shaped politicization of European
integration?
Commission policy on and off the public’s radar
One of the most distinguished features of the European Commission is its
monopoly in initiating supranational legislation, which provides it with signifi-
cant agenda-setting powers (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). Like broad strands of
the literature, this article assumes that the Commission exploits these powers
Figure 1. Aggregate index of EU politicization (salience, polarization, and mobilization) in
the EU-6 countries.
Notes: The grey line presents monthly index values, the black line their six-month moving average. The
straight line provides a monthly OLS time trend and its 95% confidence interval. For details, see Rauh
(2016: Chapter 2).
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also to ensure the expansion of its own supranational competences (Fran-
chino 2007).2 This requires that the Commission can build on a sufficient
stock of output legitimacy, that is, the added value its activities produce for
major stakeholders (Majone 2002; Moravcsik 2002). Member state govern-
ments are most important in this regard. They have delegated competences
to the Commission in order to overcome short-term political pressures that
hamper cross-national cooperation (Moravcsik 1998). Substantially, this del-
egation has focussed on the stimulation of economic growth through the cre-
ation of a common market that removes, overrules, or harmonizes national
policies hampering cross-border trade (Scharpf 1999). This has rendered
cross-nationally operating producers a second important stakeholder group
for the Commission (Coen 1998).
In the context of EU politicization, however, these traditional sources of
output legitimacy are insufficient at best. First, politicization means that the
supranational level becomes a much more direct addressee of public evalu-
ation (Zürn 2006). The more alert the public becomes to supranational politi-
cal authority, the more rational it is for a competence-seeking bureaucracy to
care about the public acceptability of its policies. Otherwise, the Commission
jeopardizes the further transfer of competences to the European level. This
may work indirectly where increasing public contestation lets individual
national governments adopt more critical positions toward European inte-
gration (Hooghe and Marks 2009), but it may also work through a much
more direct route – as the 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands,
the surge of Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 EP elections, or the Brexit referen-
dum in 2016 have forcefully demonstrated. In either way, the politicization of
European integration increases the weight of the wider public in the utility
function of a competence-seeking Commission.
Second, the mere pursuit of economic liberalization is hardly suitable to
demonstrate an immediate added value to the public. While gains from
open markets take time to materialize and often can only be demonstrated
by counterfactual arguments, the immediate political costs of liberalization
for vested societal interests are instantaneously visible. Moreover, while Euro-
pean elites tend to care mainly about competitiveness, the wider public often
prefers market-flanking policies instead (Dehousse and Monceau 2009;
Hooghe 2003). In result, a competence-seeking Commission has incentives
to visibly serve such public preferences.
Enhanced responsiveness comes, however, at the cost of undermining the
immunity to short-term political pressures and extant policy solutions that the
Commission’s traditional stakeholders value. For a competence-seeking
bureaucracy trying to generate output legitimacy vis-à-vis all of its stake-
holders, this creates trade-offs.
Policy responses to EU politicization should accordingly depend on the
Commission’s anticipation whether a particular initiative has a chance to
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actually influence the public’s overall evaluation of the EU. The public,
however, hardly follows each and every proceeding on the supranational
agenda. Rather, public attention is selective, particularly on issues exceeding
the domestic domain (Oppermann and Viehrig 2011). Some Commission
initiatives fly safely below the public radar, while others may touch upon
specific topics that the public currently cares about.
General EU politicization will thus especially matter if the Commission
receives signals that the legislative initiative in question addresses specific
issues that the diffuse public currently considers relevant. In this view, the
public salience of the specific issues to be regulated – that is, the degree to
which these issues are easily understandable and visible among the
broader public at the time of drafting (Epstein and Segal 2000) – moderates
the link between general EU politicization and the Commission’s policy
output.
Figure 2 summarizes the model. Politicization renders the European public
a more relevant stakeholder for further European integration, incentivizing
the Commission to adapt its policy choices to widely shared public interests
(a). On the level of individual policy initiatives, this link is moderated by the
contemporaneous public attention to the specific issues the respective Com-
mission proposal covers (b).3 In publically salient domains, the Commission
weighs the risk of alienating traditional stakeholders or contradicting extant
policy against the risk that its policy position is immediately perceived and
understood by the wider public (c). If the latter risk is sufficiently high, the
public’s evaluation of the particular initiative may feed back into the overall
political evaluation of European integration and, by implication, the Commis-
sion’s competences (d).
This argument contains endogeneity in two respects. First, general EU poli-
ticization can be understood as a cumulative response to the sum of individ-
ual supranational decisions (De Wilde 2011: 565–66; Weßels 2007). In fact, the
proposed argument rests on this assumption. From the Brussels perspective,
public attention to an issue area increases the likelihood that the
Figure 2. Theoretical model.
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Commission’s final policy choice will actually be perceived by the wider public
and taken into account in the general evaluation of the supranational polity –
no matter whether the public has perceived the issue as an originally Euro-
pean one in the first place. For an individual legislative initiative, however,
the level of the general politicization of European integration is a given
context condition that is analytically distinct from the specific contempora-
neous salience of the issues the initiative is going to cover.
Secondly, endogeneity may occur on the level of individual initiatives
because the Commission can manipulate public salience during policy formu-
lation. Individual Directorates-General (DGs) may try to push an issue up on
the public agenda by publishing studies, by circulating consultation docu-
ments, or by approaching public media directly. This creates a short circuit
in the model, but it does not contradict the expectation that issue-specific
public salience is a decisive variable moderating the effects of general EU poli-
ticization if the Commission adapts its position after the salience of the initiat-
ive in question has been successfully increased. The possibility of such short
circuits highlights that an evaluation of the model has to take policy formu-
lation process into account.
Consumer policy
To evaluate the model, we also have to specify which policy choices actually
serve widely shared public interests. To render this possible, this article
focusses on European consumer policy, defined as regulatory measures that
aim at protecting the end user of products or services against risks and disad-
vantages in economic life (Weatherill 2005). The diffuse nature of consumer
interests lets us initially expect little political clout vis-à-vis producer interests.
Consumer policy often serves as a prime example for collective action pro-
blems, which can only be overcome by entrepreneurial regulators (Pollack
1997).
Two ideal types of consumer policy are conceivable (Cseres 2005: 320).
From a purely economic perspective, consumer policies remedy market fail-
ures that preclude rational consumers from reaping the full choice offered
in a perfect market. Information-seeking and risk bearing rest primarily with
the consumers (caveat emptor principle). Regulatory interventions under
such a laissez-faire model would solely focus on allocative efficiency and boil
down to competition policy or information rules. In contrast, an interventionist
model of consumer policy emphasizes the re-allocation of consumer rights
(Janning 2004; Micklitz and Weatherill 1993). This model rests on the assump-
tion that the consumer is structurally disadvantaged in markets obscured by
product differentiation and the multiplicity of packaging, advertising, and dis-
tribution. Respective regulatory interventions establish producer responsibil-
ity for economic and physical consumer risks (caveat venditor).
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National consumer policy regimes vary in between these ideal types, which
creates trade barriers justifying supranational action in this area. However,
harmonizing specific consumer policy issues confronts the Commission with
a choice on the level of protection in the proposed European law. The political
spoils the Commission can distribute with this choice vary strongly over the
ideal-type consumer policy models.
Supranational policies tending towards the laissez-faire model increase
market access, pleasing especially producers interested in cross-border
trade. This is fully consistent with the traditional market-making mandate of
the Commission (Micklitz et al. 2004). Respective policies alienate the tra-
ditional stakeholders the least. They do not necessarily hurt consumers, but
they also do not allow the communication of immediately visible benefits
to the diffuse public. Yet, the Commission also has some room to tilt its pro-
posals towards the interventionist model. Since Amsterdam, the treaties entail
a clear, albeit legally weak basis for a ‘high level of consumer protection’
(Micklitz et al. 2004). In contrast to focussing on market access only when har-
monizing European consumer law, proposing more interventionist policies
concentrates costs of market risks on a narrow set of producers while the
Commission can claim to have protected each and every European consumer.
The more the diffuse public is considered as an important stakeholder, the
more attractive is this distribution of narrowly concentrated costs and widely
spread political benefits for a competence-seeking Commission. The key
choice variable in consumer policy, thus, is the distribution of rights and obli-
gations among producers and consumers. The theoretical model above thus
leads to the following hypothesis:
The higher the levels of general EU politicisation and public salience of the regu-
lated issues are, the more Commission initiatives will tend towards an interven-
tionist model of consumer policy.
For three reasons, this has to be understood as a probabilistic prediction. First,
politicization and issue salience can only be meaningfully understood as con-
tinuous variables (Hoeglinger 2016). Second, the dependent variable as well
must be perceived as a continuum. There is no politically unbiased absolute
measure of consumer interventionism (Janning 2004) and the Commission
does not operate in a regulatory vacuum. It rather faces a status-quo that is
either given by an existing supranational law or by national consumer policies.
Third, there is a myriad of additional factors impinging on the Commission’s
policy choices. Most importantly, it is well established that the Commission
strives to propose policies that are politically feasible in the EU’s inter-
institutional decision-making process. Thus, especially the preferences of
(qualiﬁed) Council majorities will effectively limit the range of available
options without, however, determining the Commission proposal in full (Tse-
belis and Garrett 2000). On speciﬁc consumer policy issues producers
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themselves may lobby for consumer policy interventionism in order to get
protection against extra-European competition (Trumbull 2006). And ﬁnally,
any policy choice has to be coordinated among the Commission’s different
DGs. Each of these might have their own competence-seeking motives,
varying stakeholder networks, and Commissioners with different national
and partisan backgrounds (Hartlapp et al. 2014).
Research design
Against these challenges, the empirical analysis aims at a ‘plausibility probe’
(Eckstein 1975). It intends to show that proposed argument warrants further
attention by providing a guided comparison of a medium-N set of detailed
qualitative analyses that allow for alternative explanations, within-case vari-
ation and explorative insights. Empirically, I draw from a project on position
formation inside the European Commission (Hartlapp et al. 2014).
The unit of analysis is an individual drafting process that leads to a formal
Commission proposal in consumer policy. The policy area is a circumscribable
EU competence since Maastricht (Weatherill 2005), but only the Prodi Com-
mission established a fully fledged DG with a respective legislative mandate
(DG SANCO, Guigner 2004). Accordingly, the investigation period starts in
1999 and ends with the onset of the broader project in 2008, covering two
Commission terms in full.
I first identified all 247 proposals for binding secondary EU law that the
Commission itself flagged as consumer policy.4 Given the ambition to trace
individual drafting processes in detail, this had to be broken down further.
Constructing a perfectly guided sample, however, was not achievable since
key variables of the model – most notably consumer interventionism and
issue salience – were not readily available ex ante. Thus I rather aimed at cap-
turing relevant variation in the sample by three steps. First, I scattered the
selected initiatives across the investigation period to maximize the chance
to find variation in EU politicization and issue salience. Second, I tried to
avoid biases towards or against consumer interventionism by including
cases drafted in different Commission DGs and subject to varying internal
coordination logics (oral and written procedures). Finally, to capture the Com-
mission’s most relevant consumer policy choices, I selected the cases with the
broadest legal scope from the resulting strata, that is, preferring general
purpose instruments over product- or service-specific regulations. This
results in the 17 policy initiatives summarized in Table 1. While this is a purpo-
sive sample aimed at learning rather than generalization, note that it contains
all essential legislative initiatives on contractual consumer rights, product
safety, and food safety submitted by the Prodi and Barroso I Commissions.
To capture the dependent variable – consumer interventionism proposed by
the Commission – each legislative proposal was divided into a set of key
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Table 1. Sample of legislative drafting processes in consumer policy (1999–2008) and summary of case study results.
COM proposal Issue
Lead
DG
Drafting
period
Outcome perspective Process perspective
Complementary
explanations
EU
politicization
Issue
salience
Consumer
interventionism
Politicization
mode
Salience
mode
Co-varying
choices
Contractual
consumer
rights
COM(2000)392 Universal service INFSO Dec 1998–
Apr 2000
+ + + middle late yes Political feasibility
(Council)
COM(2001)546 Sales promotions MARKT May 1998–
Oct 2001
+ − − late – no –
COM(2001)784 Air passenger rights TREN Dec 1999–
Dec 2001
+ + + late constant yes Political feasibility
(Council / EP)
COM(2002)443 Consumer credit SANCO Jun 2000–
Sep 2002
+ + + early constant yes –
COM(2003)356 Unfair commercial
practices
SANCO Dec 2000–
Jun 2003
o + − early constant yes Political feasibility
(Council)
COM(2008)614 Consumer rights SANCO Dec 2003–
Oct 2008
+ + o early late insuff. Political feasibility
(Council / EP)
COM(2008)816/7 Bus / maritime
passenger rights
TREN Jan 2006–
Dec 2008
+ − + early – no Political feasibility
(Council)
Product safety COM(2000)139 General product
safety
SANCO Dec 1997–
Mar 2000
o + + middle constant no Political feasibility
(Council) Producer
demand
COM(2005)457 Pyrotechnic articles ENTR Dec 2002–
Oct 2005
+ − − late – no Political feasibility
(Council) Producer
demand
COM(2007)53 ‘New approach’
overhaul
ENTR Dec 2003–
Feb 2007
+ − o early – yes Commissioner
nationality
COM(2008)9 Toy safety ENTR Jan 2003–
Jan 2008
+ + o middle late yes Political feasibility
(Council) Producer
demand
Food safety COM(2000)222 Food supplements SANCO Apr 1997–
May 2000
+ − − early – no Political feasibility
(Council)
COM(2003)424 Health claims SANCO Jul 2001–Jul
2003
o + + early constant yes Political feasibility
(Council / EP)
COM(2003)671 Addition of vitamins
and minerals
SANCO Jun 2001–
Nov 2003
o − − early – yes Political feasibility
(Council)
COM(2006)428 Food additives SANCO Jul 2001−Jul
2006
+ − o middle – yes –
COM(2008)40 Food information SANCO Jan 2005–
Jan 2008
+ + + early late yes Political feasibility
(Council)
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provisions, meaning an array of articles that distribute logically linked rights
among consumers and producers.5 For each provision, I then compare extant
policy options, stakeholder demands, and the choices in the final legislative
text to the respective regulatory status-quo. The dependent variable captures
whether the Commission proposal undermines, exceeds, or simply reinforces
the regulatory distribution of rights and risks among producers and consumers.
This requires a detailed and rather technical perspective at times but provides
replicable qualitative judgements (Rauh 2016: Appendix E).
Regarding the major independent variable, I resort to the EU politicization
index developed above. Cross-case comparisons focus on the index’ mean
levels while within-case comparisons take its fluctuation during the drafting
period into account. The second independent variable, public salience of
specific issues, is proxied by media prominence during the drafting periods
(Epstein and Segal 2000). An automated content analysis retrieved the
terms most frequently used by and across the different actors that issued pos-
ition papers on the Commission proposals in food safety, product safety, and
contractual consumer rights, respectively. These term lists were used as inputs
for a LexisNexis newspaper search, resulting in a monthly indicator for their
media prominence. These three broad salience indicators were complemen-
ted by a case specific, qualitative analysis of newspaper articles retrieved by
searches along specific key words used in the recitals of the respective Com-
mission proposal (Rauh 2016: Appendix C3).
Beyond comparisons of the model’s input and output variables, the analy-
sis asses validity of the proposed argument also by systematically analysing
within-case variation while taking explorative insights and major alternative
explanations into account. Since access to internal Commission data is
restricted, the corresponding case histories draw strongly on interviews
with involved Commission officials (Rauh 2016: 57). Interviewees were ident-
ified along the officials’ formal positions during the respective drafting pro-
cesses and reputational information gained during initial research.
Information was cross-validated by trying to talk to all involved Commission
DGs and hierarchy levels. A total of 41 officials could be interviewed for the
cases at hand. The greatest cluster (20 officials) lies in DG SANCO, which
signed responsible for the majority of proposals and was associated to all
others. Lower Commission echelons could be more easily accessed (24 desk
officers), but the underrepresentation of higher hierarchies is also due to
the fact that they tend to sign responsible for several cases in the sample
(10 heads of unit, 3 Directors, and 4 Cabinet members).
Finally, this was complemented with a broad range of secondary infor-
mation from internal process documentation, discussion papers, consultation
documents, press releases, and impact assessments, as well as interest group’s
position papers and coverage by Agence Europe and major European newspa-
pers. Pulling these sources together, systematically structured case histories
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were drawn up for each of the 17 drafting processes (Rauh 2016: Chapters 4–
6), focussing on the temporal dynamics in the model’s main variables as well
as the role of internal conflicts and anticipation of member state preferences.
The remainder of the article summarizes the key insights of these analyses.
Findings: serving widely shared interests under constraints
Comparing policy initiatives
Table 1 condenses the case studies. Seven initiatives favoured more consumer
rights as compared to the regulatory status-quo. In five cases, the respective
initiative rather emphasized producer freedom while four proposals merely
reinstated the status-quo. Departmental divisions in the Commission do not
explain this pattern. For example, the proposed consumer interventionism
varies heavily across the proposals drafted by the then DG for Health and Con-
sumer Protection (SANCO).
How plausible is it, however, that the combination of EU politicization and
issue salience pushes the Commission towards consumer-friendly regulation?
Clearly, a purposively constructed medium-N sample hardly allows immediate
generalization. But already the aggregate view on the 17 major policy initiat-
ives highlight that the argument cannot be readily refuted. Focussing on the
mean levels of politicization and salience during the respective drafting
period unveils seven cases that appear immediately consistent with the theor-
etical model. Comparatively high values on both independent variables are
associated with a re-distribution of rights favourable to consumers in the
initiatives on universal service, air passenger rights, consumer credit, and
food information. Where high politicization combined with only low public
salience of the specific issues, the Commission initiatives on sales promotions,
pyrotechnic articles, and food supplements exhibited further liberalization of
the affected laws instead.
Other initiatives defy clear-cut judgments, especially where we observe
only intermediate levels on the dependent variable. In the consumer rights
case, for example, high levels of EU politicization and issue salience occurred
during drafting, but the final proposal took an interventionist position on only
some, particularly salient key provisions covering online trade. Other pro-
visions reinforced or undermined the status-quo, for example, with regard
to guarantee periods. Similarly mixed interventionism abounds for the toy
safety, the ‘new approach’, and the food additives proposals.
More importantly, there are four drafting processes for which we only have
intermediate politicization values. The table’s classification assesses whether
the mean of the politicization index in the drafting period differs significantly
from the average politicization levels observed before. This sets the bar very
high and points to a conceptual threshold problem. EU politicization has
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increased, but we do not know which level is sufficient to create the theorized
Commission incentives and whether this level has been reached before the
investigation period already. Future research could tackle this by testing the
argument in earlier periods of integration, by normalizing the politicization
of European integration against other political issues (Hoeglinger 2016), or
by comparing policy responses to politicization across different international
organizations (Rauh and Bödeker 2016). For the present project, we have to
focus on the within-case variation discussed below.
The comparative perspective yields more consistency on issue salience. Of
the eight cases that indicate interventionist deviations from the status-quo, six
were drafted under comparatively high media attention to the issues covered
by the respective proposal. The four cases with intermediate interventionism
are also roughly in line. Two of these – the ‘new approach’ revision and the
food additives proposal – merely re-codified the regulatory status-quo. The
two others – consumer rights and toy safety – contained some liberalizing
but also some rather interventionist provisions on specific issues that were
on the public agenda at the time of drafting. Regarding online terms and con-
ditions as well as chemicals in toys, the Commission was responsive, although
these specific issues did not tip the aggregate judgement on these proposals.
In sum, the comparative summary yields seven cases fully consistent with
the theoretical model, six cases where it can neither be confirmed nor falsified,
and two cases in which the observed consumer interventionism was not driven
by EU politicization and issue salience. While these findings cannot be readily
generalized, the patterns encourage further analysis of the argument.
Adapting positions during drafting
The Commission’s choices on consumer interventionism during the drafting
process provide additional information to evaluate the theoretical argument’s
plausibility. Panel three in Table 1 provides a rough indication during which
stage politicization and issue salience reached their mode, and notes
whether this coincided with swings towards more interventionist or liberaliz-
ing positions.
This within-case perspective initially reinforces the role of issue salience.
For example, in toy safety, DG ENTR foresaw rather liberal rules during
more than five years of drafting but suddenly adopted more interventionist
provisions on safety requirements, on chemical regulation, and on labelling
once huge recalls of Chinese toys hit the European market in 2007. The
soaring public salience of the issue – not the least driven by poisoned
Barbie dolls in the European market – put DG ENTR under pressure in the
final stages of drafting because ‘people wanted to have immediate results’
(COM25:234). The late inclusion of a social review clause into the universal
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service proposal, when media attention to widespread internet access rose in
late 1999, serves as a similar example.
More importantly, the reconstruction of the drafting processes reveals
cases during which issue-specific media prominence remained stable and
the Commission adapted its position along swings in the EU politicization
index. The 2001 air passenger rights proposal provides an example. Commis-
sion officials were aware that bad customer treatment by airline companies
‘was all the time in the media’ (COM33:136), but DG TREN only committed
to a formal initiative when the general EU politicization started to rise again
during the preparation of the Nice negotiations. In this context, the drafting
officials argued that the EU-induced air transport liberalization had been
about ‘advantages for the industry’while it was now time to ‘refocus transport
policy on the demands and needs of its citizens’ (COM33:140). Against out-
right industry opposition, the officials publically proposed to quadruple con-
sumer compensations for delayed and cancelled flights only when EU
politicization had almost reached its local 2001 peak.
The same peak was exploited by DG SANCO in drafting the proposal on
consumer credit. In contrast to what was internally agreed with DG MARKT
before, SANCO only then publically committed to very interventionist pos-
itions in this proposal. This concerned the inclusion of mortgages and
especially a principle that made creditors responsible for correctly assessing
the financial situation of debtors. Knowing that this was ‘a very political file
[…] with a big public appeal’ (COM119:171), the officials tried ‘to create a
very comprehensive, very exhaustive consumer credit regulation which
would be burdensome for industry’ (COM89:46).
Also during that summer, SANCO’s initial preparations for the unfair com-
mercial practices proposal entailed a generalized producer duty for fair
trading. However, this interventionist position was scaled down to a neatly cir-
cumscribed set of prohibited practices during the sub-standard levels of poli-
ticization in the years 2002 and 2003. This change of the Commission’s policy
position occurred despite constant media prominence of unfair commercial
practices in cross-border online trade.
Likewise, the high politicization phases in 2004 and 2005, and the later
decline were mirrored in Commission positions. The proposed ‘new approach’
overhaul provides evidence. Major enhancements of market surveillance such
as the centralization of the notification system were contemplated by DG
ENTR during 2004. This was later cut back to a mere re-codification of the
existing rules during the final stages in 2006 and 2007. The other ‘neutral’
case in the sample showed a parallel decline in Commission interventionism.
When formulating the policy on food additives, DG SANCO considered the
inclusion of processing aids and the time-limited authorization of additives
during the high politicization phase of 2005, but dropped these ideas
against producer opposition when EU politicization reverted during the
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 357
final stages of drafting. Lastly, even in the finally rather interventionist 2008
Commission proposal on food information we see concessions to producers
on alcoholic beverages and origin labelling in parallel to declining EU politici-
zation in the last half-year of position formation. Again, this happened despite
rising public salience as captured in frequent media reporting on food
regulation.
All these examples concern only parts of the policy proposals, and they
switched the judgement on the final outcome only for some. But these
within-case adaptations of policy positions provide tangible evidence consist-
ent with the theoretical claims. Not only was the Commission sensitive to
varying salience of the specific issues in question, but where salience
remained stable, its policy positions also mirrored major upsurges and
declines in general EU politicization.
Procedural observations and alternative explanations
The case histories reveal additional detail on how EU politicization and issue
salience affect the intricacies of policy drafting inside the Commission, but
also indicate limits of the theorized effect.
More interventionist choices by the Commission usually met very explicit
opposition of affected industry groups. Only in three product safety cases,
certain industries supported a more interventionist stance as a means to
protect them against external competition, most notably from China. Lobby-
ing by consumer groups – especially through their European umbrella organ-
ization, BEUC – could be observed across all but one proposal in the sample.
They consistently pushed for more interventionist rules. But only in cases
subject to high EU politicization and issue salience, the Commission’s policy
choices indicate neat congruence to the demands that consumer groups
voiced in their position papers. This also holds within cases: shifts towards
more interventionist policy positions occurred most often by explicitly
taking those consumer group demands on board that had been declined
earlier. Public interest groups provide the Commission with readily available
templates for which public attractiveness can be assumed. This finding
bodes well with research on public salience as a relevant lobbying resource
(De Bruycker 2016; Dür and Mateo 2014; Klüver 2011).
The case studies furthermore suggest that salient initiatives in a politicized
context involve the Commission’s political hierarchies to a greater extent. For
example, either rising politicization levels as in the consumer credit case or
increasing issue salience as in the toy safety case made desk officials explicitly
seek the political backing of their cabinets and Commissioners. The adminis-
trative level, however, has significant agenda-setting powers in this regard. As
one official put it: ‘the services, we have a larger view, which allows us to
choose at every moment, depending on the political momentum, the kind
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of proposal we would like to boost at that time’ (COM33:164). In the bus and
maritime passenger cases, an outgoing Commissioner opposed more inter-
ventionism, but the service level merely paused until the political leadership
changed.
Commissioner nationality or partisanship hardly explain consumer policy
choices – in the present sample interventionism varies more within than
across Commissioners’ office terms. The comparatively liberal proposals on
unfair commercial practices or the food fortification initiative but also the
highly interventionist proposals on consumer credit or health claims, for
example, were adopted under Commissioner Byrne. In 10 cases, the political
leadership of the lead DG changed during drafting, but no changes in consu-
mer interventionism could be detected in response. Future research studying
policy effects of politicization should then not only focus on the Commission’s
political leaders but also on its administrative echelons.
The findings indeed suggest that public attention creates opportunities for
competence-seeking bureaucrats. In a number of instances, Commission DGs
actively tried to increase public salience in order to garner support for their
regulatory plans. Glaring evidence abounded in the air passenger rights
case. In a context of repeated media reporting on overbooking practices of
airline companies, DG TREN publically pushed airlines into a voluntary agree-
ment only to override it with an even stronger regulation later on. Similarly, DG
SANCO used widely circulated consultations, the publication of studies, and a
range of soft-law measures on obesity in Europe to prepare the ground for its
encompassing and comparatively interventionist food information proposal.
In this vein, politicization and issue salience can be both a driver and an
asset for turf conflicts inside the Commission. The case studies highlight
that more interventionist policy plans are internally often opposed by DGs
that defend their traditionally more liberal approach. For example, DG
SANCO’s interventionist positions in the consumer credit case met the
fierce opposition of DG MARKT. But once politicization peaked in 2001
against a constantly high salience of consumer over-indebtedness in the
press, DG SANCO waged to publically commit to internally highly contested
provisions, for example, on the responsible lending principle, and managed
to assert most of them until the proposal was formally adopted. DG SANCO
had also been unsuccessfully pressing DG ENTR on a clear reference to its
own, more interventionist general product safety directive in ‘new approach’
instruments. Only when a range of toy recalls increased public salience during
late 2007 when ENTR drafted a regulation on toy safety along this model,
SANCO’s long-standing demands suddenly became assertive. Here, DG
SANCO strategically used the publication of its own data on toy recalls as
well as several public speeches of its own Commissioner to put political
pressure on DG ENTR. Likewise, frequent newspaper appearances and
speeches of Commissioner Kuneva promoting consumer protection by the
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Commission shielded the 2008 consumer rights proposal against internal con-
cessions during the final internal negotiations with DG MARKT.
For future research on Commission responsiveness, these examples high-
light two things. First, extending the competence-seeking assumption to indi-
vidual Commission DGs helps to explain policy choices of the Commission as a
whole. Second, EU politicization and issue salience can present an opportunity
structure for some of these internal actors – supporting especially policy man-
dates that address diffuse public concerns more directly.
While these findings make it plausible that public politicization and issue
salience affect the Commission’s policy choices, the case studies also under-
score that the member state governments remain the Commission’s most
important stakeholders. In 13 cases, drafting officials engaged strongly in
uncovering the political feasibility of policy choices in the Council. Strategies
included not only formal communications to the Council and consultation of
individual governments, but also the involvement of national working groups
in which consecutive draft proposals were negotiated. Comparing the final
legal texts to national concerns voiced during drafting indicates that the
latter sometimes provide upper bounds for consumer interventionism. For
example, the Commission excluded products used in services from the
scope of the general product safety directive or removed obligatory colour-
coded nutrient information from the food information proposal in response
to anticipated Council opposition. But sometimes national preferences also
provided lower bounds and limited liberalization plans envisaged by the
responsible DG. For instance, most of the remaining trade restrictions in the
pyrotech proposal can be traced to national demands. National preferences
thus trimmed the lead DG’s ideal positions without determining them fully.
This suggests that the political feasibility in the Council defines the leeway
in which the Commission’s policy reactions to the politicization of European
integration can unfold.
A Commission official summarizes this succinctly:
We have looked at an issue and we are trying to move forward in line with the
common European interest. But then there are two considerations. One is: can
we get this through? You know, if you propose something that has no chance
of getting through […] it makes us look politically impotent and it doesn’t
help Europeans. And the other side is that we would hope that everything we
do is something that can be explained to the citizens because it is in their inter-
est. But obviously sometimes the easier it is to make that case, the more we like
the dossier. (COM113:98)
Conclusion: chances and risks of politicization
The 17 case studies of policy formulation in European consumer policy
between 1999 and 2008 provide multiple observations consistent with the
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argument that widespread EU politicization creates Commission incentives to
serve immediate public interests in contemporaneously salient initiatives. The
plausibility probe suggests that even Commission bureaucrats, who are
usually portrayed as the most distant and technocratic actors in the EU’s
polity, are aware about the immediate distributional consequences of their
policy choices and are willing to adapt them to changes in the political
context of European integration. To put it in the words of one of these officials:
Certainly, if we want to continue, probably best would be to improve the
people’s acceptance of the EU integration process – we should legislate in a
way that people can identify with the level at which the decision is taken and
with the substance of what we are doing. (COM81:40)
These findings suggest that EU politicization can indeed increase suprana-
tional responsiveness. It creates an incentive structure in which non-govern-
mental organizations representing diffuse societal interests can strengthen
their influence on supranational policy by raising the public salience of their
requests (cf. De Bruycker 2016; Dür and Mateo 2014; Klüver 2011). EU politici-
zation is thus not only constraining – in policy fields that allow the immediate
presentation of wide-spread public benefits it may also lead to more inte-
gration instead.
Enhanced output responsiveness may help in convincing European citizens
that EU policies are not fundamentally biased against public preferences. This
will not fully gratify the proponents of a politicized integration process whose
benchmark is popular democracy (Hix 2006). Nevertheless, the Commission’s
engagement in demonstrating immediate public benefits creates a valuable
precondition for enhancing input legitimacy in the future. The more citizens
become aware that Europe can do something for them in the short term as
well, the more EP elections would be about the European policies that citizens
actually demand – carrying them beyond being mere contests on whether
voters support the EU in principle.
Yet, as feared by critics of more politicized decision-making (Majone 2002)
the price for such responsiveness is less efficiency. Public salience can lead the
Commission to challenge deeply entrenched regulatory solutions, resulting in
partly contradictory law and pronounced internal turf conflicts. The case
studies furthermore underline that the political feasibility of Commission
initiatives in the Council remains a decisive constraint. An overall assessment
of the policy consequences of politicization has to take its effects on Council
decisions into account. A reduced bargaining space or biases towards
member states with stronger domestic dissensus are plausible expectations
in this regard (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Wratil 2018).
Caution is also warranted when generalizing these insights to other policy
domains. On the one hand, the Commission’s activity in social policy is likely
to remain regulatory in nature (Cram 1997). On the other hand, an initiative’s
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salience mediates only whether the Commission considers the public’s recep-
tion in a politicized climate, while the question of how it responds is subject to
the distribution of societal interests on the issue in question. For the latter,
consumer policy is an easy case. Narrowly concentrated and widely dispersed
interests can be identified and cut across European societies. In other recently
salient issue areas such as social spending, migration, or monetary policy, the
public is split along class lines, along identity considerations, and even along
national borders (Hutter et al. 2016; Scharpf 2010). In such contexts, the logics
presented here may drive a Commission that is sensitive to EU politicization to
blame avoidance strategies, letting it shy away from decisions on salient but
much more controversial issues in which no unequivocal societal winners can
be identified.
In this view, EU politicization is both a chance and a risk for further Euro-
pean integration. To disentangle positive and negative effects, future large-
N research could extend the initial empirical insights to longer time periods,
different policy areas, and other institutions in the supranational decision-
making process. Capturing interventionism by automated text scaling of
policy choices against interest groups or public demands provides a promis-
ing tool in this regard (e.g., Klüver 2011). The plausibility probe summarized
here highlights that we need more research on how European institutions
can channel widespread public contestation into acceptable policy choices.
Notes
1. A more detailed discussion of these indicators is provided in Rauh (2016:
Chapter 2). Data are available at www.christian-rauh.eu/data-and-resources
(accessed 5 March 2018).
2. Given varying attitudes in the Commission (Kassim et al. 2013), this is a simplify-
ing assumption. However, Commission officials tend to assess their organiz-
ational environment along rational calculations (Bauer 2012) and realize that
the politicization of European integration challenges supranational compe-
tences (Bes 2017). The model developed here also works with the more con-
strained assumption that Commission officials on average hold a preference
to at least retain the regulatory powers of the Commission.
3. This implies an interaction effect of general EU politicization and the salience of
specific issues. Both together account for policy choices geared towards serving
wide-spread interests. In a hypothetical scenario in which supranational authority
is not publically contested at all, salience of specific issues should not have a
direct effect on a Commission without direct electoral accountability. Conversely,
where the contemporaneous public would not care about a specific issue at all,
the Commission should not deviate from the interests of its primary stakeholders.
4. Identification resorted to the EUR-Lex directory codes ‘general consumer pol-
icies’ (15.20.10), ‘consumer information, education and representation’
(15.20.20), ‘protection of consumer health and safety’ (15.20.30), and ‘protection
of economic interests’ (15.20.40). The full universe of cases is part of the replica-
tion package.
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5. For example, the 2008 proposal on consumer rights comprises six key provisions
on scope and harmonization approach, pre-contractual information obligations
for traders, trader obligations for off-premise and distance contracts, trader obli-
gations after the sales contract, commercial guarantees and general rules on
contract terms.
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